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WENDY E. PARMET (Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 2009),
304 pages, $26.95.
Reviewed by Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, J.D., Lawrence, Kansas.∗
INTRODUCTION
Wendy Parmet’s new book, Populations, Public Health, and the Law, is a
provocative, milestone contribution to the growing body of public health law
scholarship. The recognition that there is a “body” of scholarship on public
health law is noteworthy enough. With Parmet’s book, it is as if public health
law has graduated from the college term paper to the doctoral dissertation. She
provides not merely a generously footnoted, careful description of the field
but also a new way of thinking about law more broadly. Like any worthy dis-
sertation, her book clearly defines its thesis and opens the door for discussion
and disagreement.
Public health and public health law have experienced a renaissance in
the last decade, necessitated by unprecedented international terrorist attacks,
devastating natural disasters, and new, virulent strains of contagious diseases.
Events such as 9/11, the SARS outbreak, and Hurricane Katrina required
communities to band together to treat the victims, address the threats, and
rebuild their cities. As a result, the tools of public health and the laws un-
dergirding them, which facilitate collective action to address broad, societal
problems, were dusted off and put into regular use. Public health law schol-
ars seized the opportunity to publish comprehensive, copiously researched
treatises, compendia, and other descriptive reference manuals on the topic.1
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law, Lawrence, Kansas. Address corre-
spondence to Professor Leonard at University of Kansas School of Law, 1535 West 15th St., Lawrence,
KS 66045, or via e-mail at eleonard@ku.edu. Editor’s Note: The numbers in brackets in the text refer
to pages in the reviewed work.
1 See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (2d ed. 2008); LAWRENCE
O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS (2002); DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW (2d ed. 2008); KENNETH R. WING ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (2007); LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH
PRACTICE (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003); see also Wendy E. Parmet & Anthony Robbins, Public
Health Literacy for Lawyers, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 701, 701 & n.5 (discussing increasing importance
of public health in society and legal practice and urging development of law school curricula).
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428 LEONARD
Much of that scholarship undertook “simply” to define the field to the broader
legal academy and public and, accordingly, typically adopted a fairly neutral
stance. I say “simply” because it is no small task even to define and describe
the laws relevant to the multi-layered, interdisciplinary field of public health,
which has been defined by the Institute of Medicine as “what we, as a society,
do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy.”2 But
until Parmet’s book, none of the public health law literature attempted to frame
a comprehensive, generally applicable normative paradigm for legal analysis.3
Wendy Parmet, the George J. and Kathleen Waters Matthews Distin-
guished University Professor of Law at Northeastern University, proposes a
new approach, called “population-based legal analysis” [2]. This approach
considers the impact of laws and judicial decisions on the population as a
whole, rather than individual parties to a lawsuit. Her starting premise is that
protection and promotion of public health is a fundamental objective of the
law. Two core principles of the approach are recognition that “[p]opulations,
as well as individuals, must be viewed as central targets of the law’s concern”
and that “legal analysis must be open to and mindful of empirically gained
knowledge as well as probabilistic reasoning” [2]. After defining the paradigm
in the opening chapters, Parmet guides readers to reconsider traditional ar-
eas of law, including Constitutional Law, Torts, Health Law, and Bioethics,
through the lens of population-based legal analysis.
THE QUALITY OF LAW
It is an ambitious and at times controversial project. The thesis operates
both prospectively and retrospectively. She urges current and future lawmakers
to consider the population health impact of their enactments and decisions. She
also traces the history of public health-oriented case law to demonstrate that
her proposal is not so much a novel departure from current law but a broader
application of an already recognized, essential theme in the law. The book
is controversial because it challenges conventional views on legal analysis,
the role of courts, and purpose of law. To accept Parmet’s thesis requires
the reader to accept two underlying assumptions: first, that the law’s aim is
the common good of society; and, second, that the common good of society
includes promotion of public health. Putting the two together and removing
the linking couplet leads to the conclusion that the law’s aim is the promotion
of public health.
2 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1988).
3 Parmet notes that her effort goes beyond the current public health revival by “recognizing that protection
of population health is a goal of law itself and not simply of public health law, population-based legal
analysis extends its reach beyond those topics and questions that have traditionally been viewed as
falling within the boundaries of public health law” [51].
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POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND LAW 429
I, for one, do not usually consider population health central to legal
reasoning, even though I, perhaps more than others, could be naturally
inclined to this view as a teacher of Public Health Law, Health Care
Financing and Regulation, and Torts. Even in Torts, I emphasize various
policy themes consistent with Parmet’s population perspective, including
the nature of risk, incentives for safety, and allocation of scarce resources.
Moreover, I greatly admire and rely on Parmet’s superb body of schol-
arship on health law, public health law, and constitutional law in my
own research.4 Yet, I still found myself unsure about Parmet’s proposed
reorientation.
Struggling with my own dissonance, I described Parmet’s thesis to two
different people: first, my husband, an artisan baker and organic grain and
milling consultant; second, my colleague, a tax law expert. Not surprisingly,
I received very different reactions. Parmet’s suggestion seemed eminently
reasonable to my husband and inherently unworkable to my colleague. The
population-based perspective reminded my husband of a baking seminar that
he once taught, in which he urged that the “quality” of bread should be
defined not simply by the appearance or taste of the loaf but consideration
of the bread’s place in the community, the way it nourishes the family who
consumes it, the impact of the wheat cultivation and harvest on the people
and soil that produced it, and the enjoyment and well-being of the bakers who
made it. Similarly, Parmet’s suggestion that the “quality” of law encompasses
protection and promotion of the health of the entire community seems fitting
and desirable. Law, if it is done right, will consider not just the effect on one
or two individuals before the court but also the rest of the population who
shape and benefit from it.
My tax law colleague’s reaction was closer to mine, and, I expect, others
trained in traditional approaches to the law. Certainly, courts routinely rely on a
range of tools to interpret the law and decide cases. Constitutional decisions,
despite the urging of some,5 look not only to the text, plain meaning, and
original intent but also consider the purposes behind the law and current
4 Just a small sample of Parmet’s scholarship includes: Wilfredo Lopez, Wendy E. Parmet et al., Due
Process and Public Health, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 33 (2007); Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health and
Constitutional Law: Recognizing the Relationship, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 13 (2007); Wendy
E. Parmet, Free Speech and Public Health: A Population-Based Approach to the First Amendment,
39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 363 (2006); Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS, and the
Curtailment of Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85 (2003); Wendy
E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public
Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476 (1996); Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public
Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 278-81 (1993).
5 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 1-5 (1990).
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430 LEONARD
societal values to inform their decisions.6 Public policy goals are explicitly
embodied in a number of areas of law. In my Torts class, I urge students to
justify different rules in different jurisdictions by considering the policies and
social goals underlying the law, including public health.7 Tax law involves the
exercise of government power to require individual citizens to contribute to the
collective good and the creation of incentives for business and private action.
Those areas of law seem amenable to Parmet’s approach. Nevertheless, my
colleague and I had a hard time swallowing Parmet’s suggestion that public
health is or should be a necessary staple of the judicial diet [28]. She clarifies
that promotion of population-based legal analysis should not be “considered
the only or most privileged legal norm, only that it is among those that are and
ought to be woven into the fabric of legal culture and legal decision making”
[57]. Parmet merely urges that population and public health be included as
part of the conversation.
APPLYING THE NEW PARADIGM
Setting aside my initial discomfort, I was anxious to be convinced by
Parmet’s adept legal reasoning and encyclopedic research. In the heart of
the book, she applies her rubric to traditional legal doctrine. Parmet is a
highly respected, prolific constitutional scholar, whose expertise is evident
in her chapters on “Population Health and Federalism: Whose Job Is It?,”
“Individual Rights, Population Health, and Due Process,” “A Right to Die?
Further Reflections on Due Process Rights,” and “The First Amendment and
the Obesity Epidemic.” Even if the reader remains unconvinced about the
relevance of the population-based perspective, the book is a highly engaging
intellectual exercise.
With respect to federalism, Parmet concludes that objectives of
population-based legal analysis are better achieved at the state rather than
federal level [85]. Public health promotion is consistent with the states’ tra-
ditional Tenth Amendment reserved police powers to protect the health, wel-
fare, and safety of citizens. The preference for state law also promotes the
goal of increased reliance on empirically gained knowledge and probabilistic
reasoning. States may serve as “laboratories,”8experimenting with different
approaches to social and public health problems and generating usable data to
inform other states and federal lawmakers about public health interventions,
health reform, and social policy.
6 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535
(1999); Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165 (2008);
Frederick Schauer, The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 729 (1992).
7 See Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 27 (2007).
8 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND LAW 431
Parmet acknowledges that federal intervention may be appropriate when
interstate solutions to increasingly complex and cross-border social, eco-
nomic, environmental, health, and security problems are needed [89]. Em-
pirical evidence can help here, too, she suggests. Courts should consider the
nature of the risk and probable effect to decide the core federalism question:
whether authority for any particular government action is best allocated at the
state (for example, solid waste disposal or traffic safety) versus the federal
(for example, airborne infectious diseases) level. It is a radical suggestion that
courts should “dare to face the empirical world of epidemiology and public
health” [103] to resolve not only substantive legal questions but also structure
of government dilemmas.
In the individual rights chapter, Parmet discusses early Supreme Court
cases bearing on public health to show that, at least historically, the Court
often upheld states’ broad police powers against challenges by individuals.
But the Court gradually shifted toward the contemporary, individual rights-
favoring orientation, beginning with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment [118]. The Civil Rights Amendments aimed primarily at protecting rights
of newly freed men from infringement by states, but have been given much
wider application, in many cases tying the hands of states from effectively pro-
tecting the public’s health. Parmet paints a striking, population-based picture
of canonical constitutional law cases, including the Slaughter-House cases,9
Lochner,10 Carolene Products (and its famous footnote four),11 Lawrence v.
Texas,12 and Washington v. Glucksberg,13 suggesting in each case how the
Court could have, failed to, or did apply population-based legal analysis
[119–27].
The recasting is intriguing and provocative. For example, she suggests
that the Carolene Products Court’s protection of “discrete and insular minori-
ties” is consistent with her approach. “Justice Stone seemed to recognize, as
a judge using population-based legal analysis would, that laws can target par-
ticular groups” [125]. I had an easier time accepting her normative suggestion
about the relevance of population health in some individual rights cases than
in others. For example, I wholeheartedly agree that the public health effects of
allowing terminally ill individuals to short-circuit the FDA new drug approval
process should be considered.14 But I have trouble seeing the relevance of the
9 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
10 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
12 539 U.S. 588 (2003).
13 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
14 Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons,
86 WASH. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1234542 (discussing
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Experimental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (en banc)) (last visited June 4, 2009).
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432 LEONARD
broader population in the decision to strike down laws criminalizing sodomy
between consenting adults [125–26].
Parmet next strides confidently into the thorniest of public health and
constitutional law controversies: the inherent (my word, not hers) tension be-
tween individual rights and the public good. Jacobson v. Massachusetts15 is
the classic case, in which the Supreme Court declined to recognize the right
of one person to refuse a smallpox vaccination against the public’s interest in
preventing the spread of a virulent, deadly contagious disease. Parmet flags the
issue but then challenges the underlying premise that public health protection
necessarily impairs individual liberty [113]. In her view, seemingly restrictive
public health laws may actually promote individual rights and create other-
wise unavailable choices [114–15]. Some government interventions, such as
mandatory quarantine, which appear to restrict individual rights may enhance
liberty and benefit certain subpopulations. Perhaps the infected individual and
others like her are unable to adhere to a treatment regime because of social
conditions or special risk factors beyond their control. Applying Parmet’s
population-based spin on Carolene Products, the rights of a “discrete and
insular minority” merit government protection—though perhaps not in the
conventional way. Rather than thinking of quarantine as a government intru-
sion that severely restricts individual freedom of movement, Parmet suggests
that it may actually enhance the patient’s and her community members’ rights
by enabling them to get treatment, become healthy, and return to their usual
activities [132–33]. In thinking about rights, Parmet suggests, “the question
that must be asked is not whether there is a less restrictive way to reduce the
risk posed by any one individual, but whether any feasible intervention is less
restrictive of negative liberty and more supportive of positive liberty” [134].
The theme of positive versus negative rights is woven throughout the
book. The traditional view of constitutional rights is negative, meaning pro-
tecting individuals from government interference, as opposed to positive, im-
plicating an affirmative duty on government to provide health, education, and
other services for citizens.16 The population perspective more easily accom-
modates positive rights than traditional individual rights doctrine, a point that
Parmet has argued elsewhere.17 In Parmet’s view, positive rights, by addressing
15 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
16 See Barksy v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472-73 (1954) (Douglas, J.) (“The Bill of Rights does
not say . . . what government must give, but rather what it may not take away”); Jackson v. City of Joliet,
715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (noting that “the Constitution is a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties,” and that “[t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that
government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them”); Susan Bandes,
The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2273 (1990); Frank B. Cross, The Error
of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986).
17 Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution, supra note 4, at 271-77.
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POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND LAW 433
population-based risk factors, discrimination, and other disadvantages may be
essential to individuals’ fully realizing their own liberty [115–16].
That view also informs the chapter on bioethics. The landmark right-to-
die cases, Quinlan18 and Cruzan,19 operate from a negative rights perspective,
recognizing that individuals have a right to refuse having things done to
their bodies, including life-sustaining treatment. But the negative right to be
free from unwanted intrusions, or the right “to be let alone,” is a far cry
from an affirmative right to have things done or affirmatively provided to an
individual, including the right to physician-assisted suicide in Glucksberg.20
Parmet rebukes the absence of affirmative rights as “demonstrat[ing] vividly
constitutional law’s failure to appreciate the reciprocal and interdependent
nature of negative and positive rights” and that “individuals live in, face health
risks in, and die in populations” [154–55]. The refusal to recognize affirmative
rights limits states’ abilities to protect the health of their populations and effect
meaningful choices for individuals.
Parmet suggests that courts have failed to protect individual rights by
conceiving of end-of-life choices as autonomous rather than the result of
interdependent socioeconomic conditions. Individual health status, chronic
disease, and risk of serious injury (a car accident, in Cruzan’s case) may
also be caused or exacerbated by factors that individuals cannot control. For
example, she suggests that the Court failed to consider Nancy Cruzan’s “right
to live more safely” and thereby “face a lower risk of traumatic brain injury
following a car accident” [159]. Traditional constitutional law protects her
freedom to drive on risky roads and terminate medical care once she has been
mortally injured, but not her right to drive more safely, which “would have
been essential to the full vindication of her autonomy” [159]. In Parmet’s
view, the rights protected in bioethics decisions “help too few and come too
late” [159].
Similarly, the Court’s robust protection of free speech rights may ex-
pose vulnerable populations, especially children, to misleading information
or deprive them of useful information essential to promoting positive lib-
erty and individual choice. In her chapter on the obesity epidemic, Parmet
begins by describing the pressing population problem of childhood obesity.
She then shifts, somewhat abruptly for my reluctantly reorienting mind, to
the role of commercial and compelled speech on the obesity epidemic [171].
Once I made the leap, though, I found her discussion another useful, if less
firmly grounded, example of how courts could (and arguably should) decide
cases with the population’s health in mind. The remaining chapters reconsider
Health Law, Torts, and International Law in light of population-based legal
18 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
19 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
20 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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434 LEONARD
analysis, urging the reader to reconsider the law’s overly individualistic orien-
tation and recognize the interdependence of rights, choices, and risks within
populations.
CONCLUSION
Although I still mostly judge the quality of my morning toast by the
taste, texture, and appearance of the bread, I am grateful to my husband for
expanding my appreciation for the process of bread-making and the effect
of my food choices on our community. Likewise, I still differ with some of
Wendy Parmet’s views on the scope of public health law, judicial recognition of
positive rights, the role of individual choice, and the near-universal relevance
of population health to legal decisions. But my perspective and the quality of
my public health law scholarship are undeniably enriched by her stimulating
contribution.
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